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Religious  studies  of  fertility  typically  focus  on  the  effect  of  religious  affiliation  on 
fertility; the role of religiosity in determining fertility remains overlooked. Meanwhile, 
most studies focus on studying female fertility; whether religion and religiosity have 
significantly  different  impacts  on  men’s  and  women’s  fertility  rarely  has  been 
examined. To fill these gaps, this study uses data from the 2002 NSFG Cycle 6 on 
religious affiliation, religiosity, and children ever born (CEB) for both men and women 
to  investigate  the  effects  of  religious  affiliation  and  religiosity  on  male  and  female 
fertility. A series of hypotheses which aim to demonstrate the critical role of religiosity, 
particularly the importance of religious beliefs in people’s daily life in shaping people’s 
fertility  behavior  are  tested.  The  findings  show  a  shrinking  pattern  of  fertility 
differentials among religious groups. However, religiosity, particularly religious beliefs, 
shows a substantially positive effect on fertility. The gender interaction terms are not 
significant which indicates that the effects of religion and religiosity on fertility do not 
vary by gender.  
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1. Introduction 
Most religious and demographic studies of religion and fertility in the United States 
elaborate female  fertility differentials among people  who  are affiliated  with  various 
religious denominations (Janssen and Hauser 1981; Lehrer 1996; Lehrer 2004; Marcum 
1988; Mosher, Johnson, and Horn 1986; Poston 1990). Catholics often are reported as 
having a particularly high level of fertility. Protestants’ fertility is shown to be lower 
than that of Catholics and is located in the middle of the continuum. Non-Orthodox 
Jews are at the end of the continuum and have consistently shown the lowest fertility 
rate among all religious groups in the U.S. (Lehrer 2004; Sander 1993). In recent years, 
however, demographers have reported that fertility differences among Catholics and 
other religious groups have been shrinking, and that Protestants’ fertility tends to be 
higher than that of Catholics and other religious groups (Mosher, Johnson, and Horn 
1986; National Center for Health Statistics 2005; Westoff and Jones 1979).  
Four principal hypotheses have been proposed in the literature of religious studies 
of fertility to explain these fertility differentials, namely, (1) the particularized theology 
hypothesis, (2) the characteristics hypothesis, (3) the minority status hypothesis, and (4) 
the social interaction hypothesis (Chamie 1981; McQuillan 2004). The particularized 
theology  hypothesis  views  fertility  differentials  as  a  result  of  specific  doctrinal 
differences  among  religions.  According  to  this  perspective,  religious  groups  whose 
doctrines are against contraception and abortion and favor a large family size should 
have a higher fertility rate. For those religious groups who do not have such doctrines, 
the fertility rate should be lower. Examples of religious groups with these doctrines 
include  Roman  Catholics,  fundamentalist  Protestants,  Latter-Day  Saints  (Mormons), 
and  Amish.  Religious  groups  who  have  no  proscriptions  on  birth  control  are,  for 
example, mainstream Protestants and Jews (Jurecki-Tiller 2004). Empirical research has 
provided some evidence for the particularized theology hypothesis by demonstrating 
that mainstream Protestants and Jews have higher levels of contraceptive use and lower 
fertility  rates  compared  to  Catholics  and  fundamentalist  Protestants  (De  Jong  1965; 
Freedman,  Whelpton,  and  Campbell  1961;  Mosher  and  Hendershot  1984;  Mosher, 
Williams, and Johnson 1992). 
 The characteristics hypothesis argues that fertility differentials among religious 
groups are not caused by religious doctrines. Rather, demographic and socioeconomic 
differentials of the members of religious groups result in their fertility differences. Once 
demographic and socioeconomic statuses of religious groups are controlled, fertility 
differentials among religious groups should disappear. The characteristics hypothesis 
also is supported by previous findings. For instance, the U.S. Catholic and non-Catholic 
fertility  differentials  disappear  after  controlling  for  their  members’  socioeconomic Demographic Research: Volume 18, Article 8 
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status (Westoff and Jones 1979). Muslim fertility is found to be largely impacted by 
differences in socioeconomic conditions as well (Johnson-Hanks 2006).  
The  third  perspective,  the  minority  group  status  hypothesis,  contends  that  the 
insecurity  of  minority  group  status  plays  a  role  in  depressing  fertility  of  minority 
religious groups below that of the majority. The prerequisites for the minority status 
mechanism to operate are: (1) acculturation; (2) socioeconomic mobility; and (3) no 
pronatalist  ideology  or  norms  (Goldscheider  1971:  297).  This  hypothesis  not  only 
highlights  fertility  differentials  among  religious  groups,  but  also  among  racial  and 
ethnic groups (Poston, Chang, and Dan 2006). The definition of minority group status is 
based on the  numerical  size  of the  group and  whether a  racial and ethnic  group is 
considered  psychologically  a  minority.  Examples  of  such  groups  are  South  African 
blacks and Latinos. In some parts of the U.S., these two groups may be a numerical 
majority  but  are  still  psychologically  treated  as  minorities  (Bouvier  and  Rao  1975; 
Chamie 1981). Part of the empirical support of this perspective comes from the low 
fertility level of Jews, which often is believed to be associated with their minority status 
(Goldscheider and Uhlenberg 1969; Lehrer 2004). 
The  last  hypothesis,  the  interaction  hypothesis,  also  is  referred  to  as  the 
socialization  hypothesis.  This  hypothesis  examines  the  role  of  social  interaction  in 
shaping  reproductive  behavior  (Bongaarts  and  Watkins  1996;  Montgomery  and 
Casterline 1996; Watkins 1992). It believes that religious institutions are a major source 
of  social  exposure  through  which  members  of  a  certain  religious  group  adopt  their 
religious  doctrines  and  are  impacted  by  other  members’  fertility  behavior.  Such  an 
approach is in line with the social networks theory and the “diffusion theory” of fertility 
which emphasize the role of interaction in shaping behavior and the diffusion effect of 
family planning ideology in influencing fertility (Coale and Watkins 1986; Watkins 
1992). Such a perspective also echoes the idea that “fertility is an aggregate property, a 
characteristic of the groups to which the couple belong and not directly of the couple 
themselves” (Ryder 1974: 76). Recent research shows more and more support for this 
hypothesis (Knodel, Gray, Sriwatchrin, and Peracca 1999; Marchena and Waite 2001; 
Ongaro 2001; Yeatman and Trinitapoli 2007).  
Previous studies of religion and fertility along with the four theoretical approaches 
have increased considerably our understanding of the relationship between religion and 
fertility.  However,  these  studies  and  approaches  mainly  have  focused  on  female 
fertility.  The  ways  in  which  male  fertility  is  impacted  by  religion  largely  has  been 
ignored.  Meanwhile,  these  studies  have  emphasized  primarily  fertility  differentials 
among people who belong to various religious denominations. The effect of religiosity 
on fertility appears to have eluded researchers. Whether people who are more engaged 
in  religion  tend  to  have  a  greater  number  of  children  regardless  of  their  religious 
denominations and whether the level of religiosity could be a determinant of fertility are Zhang: Religious affiliation, religiosity, and male and female fertility 
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unclear.  For  instance,  fundamentalist  Protestant  religious  doctrines  are  pronatalist, 
which forbid artificial forms of contraception, resist abortion, and favor relatively larger 
families  (Lehrer  1996;  Marcum  1981).  On  average,  fundamentalist  Protestants  also 
have a stronger religiosity compared to other religious groups: they attend religious 
services more frequently than people of other religious denominations (Lehrer 2004). 
Previous literature rarely examines whether their higher fertility rate is caused by their 
greater level of religiosity by attending church services more often or is caused by the 
religious teaching of their denomination regarding favoring more children. In order to 
fill these voids, in this article, I try to bring gender and religiosity into religious studies 
of fertility, and I empirically examine: (1) whether religiosity affects people’s fertility; 
(2)  whether  fertility  differentials  also  occur  among  men  who  belong  to  different 
religious denominations; and (3) whether men’s and women’s fertility outcomes are 
impacted  by  religious  affiliation  and  religiosity  in  significantly  different  manners. 
Specifically,  I  intend  to  study  how  men’s  and  women’s  fertility  patterns  differ  in 
various religious groups and among members with various levels of religiosity. I will 
set forth a series of hypotheses to examine these issues in the next section, followed by 
empirical tests of the hypotheses. 
 
 
2. Hypotheses on religion, religiosity, gender and fertility 
I now present my hypotheses regarding the above three major issues. Religiosity is an 
important aspect of religion which often is viewed as the intensity of religious beliefs 
and participation (Myers 1996). Religious beliefs are, notably, beliefs in hell, heaven, 
and an afterlife. Religious participation includes such behaviors as church attendance, 
participating in church-related activities, viewing/listening to religious broadcasts, and 
reading the holy books of the religion (Barro and McCleary 2003; Corijn 2001; Myers 
1996). Strong religiosity usually is marked by strong daily influence of religious beliefs 
on individual decisions and frequent participation in religious activities.  
Although  previous  religious  studies  mainly  focus  on  examining  fertility 
differences among religious groups, empirical analyses have shown some evidence that 
religiosity  impacts  demographic  behavior.  In  terms  of  the  effect  of  religious 
participation on fertility and fertility-related behavior, researchers observe that religious 
participation among young people is linked strongly to more positive attitudes towards 
marriage and having children (Marchena and Waite 2001). Analyzing the 1985 and 
1999 Spanish fertility Surveys, Adsera (2007) shows that in Spain, church participation 
plays an important role in shaping people’s fertility behavior. Individuals who seldom 
participate in church activities are found tend to delay significantly their timing of first 
parenthood, controlling for all other factors (Ongaro 2001).  Demographic Research: Volume 18, Article 8 
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 Then why does religious participation influence people’s demographic behavior? 
As stated earlier, the social networks approach and the “diffusion theory” of fertility 
provide explanations for this mechanism. According to the social networks perspective, 
religious  people  build  their  social  networks  by  attending  church  activities.  Regular 
churchgoers  are  connected  more  strongly  to  their  religious  group,  i.e.  their  social 
networks. As a consequence, they are more likely to accept the religious doctrines of 
their churches. In terms of their reproductive behavior, they are thus more likely to be 
influenced by their church teachings of childbearing as well as by the patterns of other 
church members’ fertility behavior. In a similar vein, the “diffusion theory,” initiated by 
Princeton demographers, explains the effect of religious participation by looking at the 
role of cultural diffusion and social interaction in spreading new cultural models of 
reproduction, i.e. birth control and family planning (Coale and Watkins 1986; Watkins 
1992).  Based  on  the  empirical  findings  and  these  explanations,  I  expect  church 
participation to be highly influential in the U.S. My first hypothesis is as follows:  
Hypothesis  1:   The  more  frequently  people  attend  religious  services,  the  more 
children they will have, controlling for religious affiliation and other factors.  
Besides  religious  participation,  religious  beliefs  also  are  important.  In  Austria, 
researchers observe that non-religious persons have a lower marital rate than religious 
persons. Non-religious women also have a lower rate of first childbearing than religious 
ones (Pfeiffer and Nowak 2001). A similar pattern also is found in other European 
countries such as Britain and Italy (Berrington 2001; Ongaro 2001). Westoff and Frejka 
(2007) examine fertility patterns among European Muslim women and find that fertility 
is directly correlated with fertility. Muslim women have a significantly higher level of 
fertility than non-Muslim women who are less religious and hold less strong family 
values.  If  “no  religion”  is  considered  as  one  extreme  on  the  religiosity  scale,  then 
empirical  findings  seem  to  suggest  that  being  more  religious  or  having  stronger 
religious beliefs is related positively to the marital rate and the likelihood of giving first 
birth. Such a positive effect can be explained by the fact that most religions encourage 
marriage and highly value the family. Since the majority of fertility behavior does occur 
within the context of marital unions in most countries (Bongaarts 1982; Hervitz 1985; 
Mosher, Johnson, and Horn 1986), having stronger religious beliefs is expected to have 
a positive effect on fertility. Based on this rationale, I predict the following:  
Hypothesis 2:  People who have strong religious beliefs are more likely to have 
more children than people without such beliefs, controlling for religious affiliation and 
other factors. 
Because I hypothesize that religiosity has a positive effect on fertility, I predict that 
fertility differentials among various religious groups may be due partly to the level of 
religiosity among members of religious groups. Thus, I hypothesize the following: Zhang: Religious affiliation, religiosity, and male and female fertility 
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Hypothesis 3:  Fertility differentials among various religious groups will decrease 
once religiosity is taken into consideration, controlling for other factors.  
Regarding  the  effect  of  religion  on  male  fertility  compared  to  that  on  female 
fertility,  researchers  have  found  mixed  results.  The  majority  of  researchers  have 
suggested that, in general, women’s behavior is more likely to be impacted by religious 
values  and  beliefs  compared  to  men  (Corijn  and  Klijzing  2001;  Goldscheider  and 
Goldscheider  1993).  An  opposite  finding  is  shown  in  Pfeiffer  and  Nowak’s  (2001) 
work. They observe that in Austria, men are more likely to be influenced by religion in 
terms of marriage and childbearing. Other researchers, however, have argued that there 
are not significant gender differences with regard to the relationship between religion 
and fertility. Janssen and Hauser (1981) examine the effects of religious and secular 
socialization  on  Wisconsin  men’s  and  women’s  fertility.  Their  findings  confirm  a 
positive  relationship  between  Catholic  religion  and  the  preference  for  having  more 
children without showing significant gender differentials. In Britain, Berrington (2001) 
shows that people with stronger levels of religiosity are more likely to marry early and 
give birth to children, but such a pattern does not differ among men and women.  
The above findings suggest that religion does have a certain effect on both male 
and female fertility and fertility-related behavior. The discrepancy  mainly occurs in 
terms  of  whether  religion  has  a  stronger  effect  on  women  than  on  men.  And  the 
majority of these studies reveal that women are influenced more by religion than men 
are. Based on these results, I predict the following:  
Hypothesis  4:    There  are  no  significant  gender  differences  regarding  fertility 
differentials among religious groups, controlling for other factors. But, 
Hypothesis  5:    Religious  participation  promotes  women’s  fertility  to  a  greater 
extent than men’s fertility, controlling for other factors. And, 
Hypothesis 6:  Religious beliefs have a stronger push effect on women’s fertility 
than on men’s, controlling for other factors. 
 
 
3. Data and variables 
So far, I have formulated hypotheses on the impact of religion and gender on fertility. 
Next, I will move to the empirical analyses that test these hypotheses. For the tests of 
my hypotheses, I use data from the 2002 National Survey of Family Growth (NSFG) 
Cycle 6 to conduct the individual level analyses. This dataset contains information on 
“fertility, marriage, cohabitation, contraception, and related issues” of 7,643 women 
aged 15 to 44 years old and 4,928 men aged 15 to 45 years old in the United States in 
year 2002 (National Center for Health Statistics 2004: 5). It is worth mentioning that 
2002 was the first time that the NSFG included men in its surveys. The original NSFG Demographic Research: Volume 18, Article 8 
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datasets  present  male  and  female  reports  in  two  separate  files.  In  my  analyses,  I 
combine the female and male datasets together for the purpose of generating gender 
interaction  terms in order to test  whether the impacts of religion and religiosity on 
fertility vary by gender.   
When studying male fertility, the validity of male reports is always the concern of 
researchers.  The  problem  of  underreporting  in  the  NSFG  dataset  is  pointed  out  by 
Rendall and associates (Rendall, Joyner, Peters, Yang, Handcock, and Ryan 2006) who 
assess  fatherhood  at  younger  ages.  The  reason  they  chose  this  group  of  male 
respondents  is  because  data  problems  are  normally  greatest  at  younger  ages.  Their 
evaluation results reveal that underreporting of fatherhood for this group of men does 
exist in the NSFG dataset; therefore, applying this dataset to examine fertility outcome 
could be problematic. Considering this matter, my analyses of the NSFG datasets are 
broken  into  two  parts  for  comparison  purposes.  The  first  part  contains  all  male 
respondents and the second part only includes those men who are 26 years of age and 
older. Correspondingly, the sample sizes for the two parts of analyses are 10,451 (3,938 
men and 6,513 women) and 8,735 (2,222 men and 6,513 women), respectively. These 
respondents  provided  information  regarding  their  religious  denominations  and 
religiosity. Respondents who did not provide such information are eliminated from the 
analyses.   
The dependent variable used in the research is fertility, which is measured by the 
number  of  children  ever  born  (CEB)  to  a  male  or  female  respondent.  For  a  male 
respondent, the survey question for CEB is “how many biological children have you 
ever had?” and for a female respondent, the equivalent question is “how many live 
births have you ever had?” These two questions are considered as measuring tool of the 
same thing for men and women, i.e. the CEB. 
 
 
3.1 Independent variables 
The independent variables are the religious variables, namely, religious affiliation and 
religiosity.  The  religious  affiliation  variable  is  operationalized  as  the  respondent’s 
current  religious  domination,  which  is  classified  as  a  set  of  four  dummy  variables: 
Catholic, fundamentalist Protestant, other Protestant, and other non-Christian religion. 
This classification follows that of the 2002 NSFG reports (National Center for Health 
Statistics  2005).  Among  those,  fundamentalist  Protestants  include  Baptists/Southern 
Baptists;  other  Protestants  include  Methodists,  Lutherans,  Presbyterians  and 
Episcopalians.  
Religiosity  is  measured  by  two  variables,  which  are  frequency  the  respondent 
attends religious services and the importance of religion in the respondent’s daily life. Zhang: Religious affiliation, religiosity, and male and female fertility 
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These  measurements  capture  the  behavior  and  belief  dimensions  of  religiosity, 
respectively. Since there is no question directly asking the strength of religious belief in 
the NSFG questionnaire, the importance of religion in the respondent’s daily life is 
used as the question measuring the strength of religious belief. For people who are 
affiliated  with  certain  religious  dominations,  possible  responses  for  the  religious 
participation variable are: more than once a week, once a week, 1-3 times per month, 
and less than once a month. Responses for the religious beliefs item are: very important, 
somewhat important, and not important. Note that the religious belief measurement in 
the NSFG dataset is inapplicable for those respondents who claim themselves having no 
religious affiliation. The data restriction allows me to only include respondents who 
claimed to be affiliated with religious denominations to examine the effect of religiosity 
on fertility. In order to provide some information of the respondents who are eliminated 
from the analyses, I present some demographic and socioeconomic characteristics of 
those people in Table 1-2.   
The NSFG questionnaire does contain questions associated with the respondents’ 
religious denomination and religiosity during their upbringing, which measure religious 
affiliation  and  the  frequency  of  religious  service  attendance  at  age  14.  But  my 
preliminary analyses do not show significant effects of these variables on CEB. Thus, I 
decided not to use those variables in the analyses. 
 
 
3.2 Control variables 
My analyses also control for some established covariates that influence fertility. These 
include demographic factors such as age, race and ethnicity, nativity, and marital status 
(Coale and Trussell 1974; Jaffe and Cullen 1975; Saenz and Morales 2005; Singley and 
Landale  1998;  Xie  and  Pimentel  1992),  and  socioeconomic  factors,  for  example, 
educational  attainment,  employment  status,  and  income  (Ballard  2004;  Ellison, 
Echevarria, and Smith 2005; Lehrer 1996; Sander 1992). These variables are used as 
control variables in the equations predicting both male and female fertility. Sex is also 
controlled in the combined dataset.  
In terms of the measurement of these control variables, age is measured in years. 
Respondent’s race and ethnicity is measured via categorizing the respondent into one of 
the following four racial and ethnic groups: Hispanic origin, non-Hispanic White, Black, 
and other. Marital status is set as a dummy variable coded as “1” if ever married and 
“0” otherwise. Nativity is a dummy variable coded as “1” if the respondent is foreign 
born and “0” otherwise. The variable gender is coded as “1” if male and “0” if female. I 
use the highest degree received to represent the respondent’s educational attainment. 
For employment status, I code it as “1” if the respondent ever worked and “0” otherwise. Demographic Research: Volume 18, Article 8 
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Income is measured by total combined gross family income in 2001, which is coded 
into four categories, ranging from under $25,000 to $75,000 or more. 
Basic descriptive statistics of variables are displayed in Tables 1-1 and 1-2. Note 
all of the information presented in Table 1-1 is only for people who claimed themselves 
affiliated with certain religions. Information for nonreligious respondents is presented 
in Table 1-2. Sample weights are applied to the descriptive analysis of each variable. 
Results show that women tend to report a higher level of CEB than men. The mean 
CEB for all females and females 26 and over are 1.3 and 1.8, with a standard error of 
0.04  and  0.03,  respectively.  The  corresponding  values  for  all  males  and  male 
respondents  26  and  over  are  1.2  with  a  standard  deviation  of  0.05  and  1.5  with  a 
standard  error  of  0.05,  respectively.  These  figures  indicate  more  variation  in  male 
fertility  than  in  female,  and  a  relatively  higher  level  of  female  fertility  than  male 
fertility. They again  suggest  male and  female  fertility differentials at the individual 
level. The higher level of female than male fertility echoes the findings based on the 
aggregate level analyses that female fertility tends to be higher than that of males in 
most industrialized countries since the 1960s (Coleman 2000). At the individual level, a 
higher female than male CEB could be due to underreporting of births by men and the 
age-specific patterns of male and female fertility. Age matters because male fertility has 
a pattern of starting later and having a peak in much older ages (Paget and Timaeus 
1994) as compared to female fertility. The male respondents who are 15 to 45 years of 
age have not yet completed their fertility. But for their female counterparts who are 15 
to 44 years of age, they are more likely to have reached their fertility peak. Thus, male 
CEB  is  relatively  lower  than  female  CEB.  When  religious  affiliation  is  taken  into 
consideration, people who claimed themselves affiliated with certain religions tend to 
report a higher level of fertility than those who were not affiliated with any religion. For 
instance, the average CEBs for non-religious male and female respondents are 0.82 and 
1.03, respectively. For male respondents who are 26 and over, the average CEB is 1.15, 
which is still lower than that of religious people in the same age group. Similar to 
respondents  with  religious  affiliations,  fertility  of  non-religious  males  shows  more 
variation than that of their female counterparts.    Zhang: Religious affiliation, religiosity, and male and female fertility 
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Table 1-1:  Descriptive statistics for respondents who claimed a religious 






(26 and over) 
  
Female  




SD  N    
Mean 
(or %) 
SD  N    
Mean 
(or %) 
SD  N 
Dependent variable                       
CEB  1.2  0.05  3,247    1.5  0.05  2,126    1.3*  0.03  6,512 
                       
Independent variables                       
Religious affiliation      3,938        2,222        6,513 
  Catholic  35.4        24.1        26.8     
  Fundamentalist Protestant  24.1        31.2        33.0     
  Other Protestant   31.0        34.9        33.4     
  Other non-Christian  9.5        9.8        6.9     
                       
Frequency of attending religious 
services  
    3,938        2,219        6,507 
  More than once a  week  10.7        10.0        14.1     
  Once a week  23.0        23.1        25.3     
  1-3 times per month  19.0        18.9        19.2     
  Less than once a month  29.0        30.2        28.0     
  Never  18.4        17.8        13.4     
                       
Importance of religious beliefs      3,920        2,215        6,495 
  Very important  47.5        49.5        57.9     
  Some important  40.3        38.3        36.1     
  Not important  12.2        12.2        6.0     
                       
Control variables                       
Demographic factors                       
Age   29.9  0.24  3,938    35.3  0.19  2,222    30.1  0.19  6,513 
Race      3,938        2,222        6,513 
  Hispanic  17.8        17.5        15.3     
  Non-Hispanic white  63.4        64.6        64.5     
  Non-Hispanic black  12.5        11.5        14.7     
  Non-Hispanic other  6.3        6.5        5.5     
Nativity-if foreign born      3,938        2,222        6,499 
  Native born  96.1        84.0        85.5     
  Foreign born  4.0        16.0        14.5     
If R ever married      3,938        2,222        6,513 
  Yes  46.7        75.6        59.5     
  No  53.3        24.4        40.5     Demographic Research: Volume 18, Article 8 
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(26 and over)  
 
Female  




SD  N   
Mean 
(or %) 
SD  N   
Mean 
(or %) 
SD  N 
Socioeconomic factors                       
Education      3,938        2,222        6,513 
  No diploma   22.6        22.7        21.1     
  High school or less  31.6             31.6        27.6     
  Some college/college  26.9        26.8        29.2     
  University and above  18.9        19.0        22.2     
If R ever worked      3,938        2,222        6,513 
  Yes  95.0        99.0        90.1     
  No  5.0        1.0        9.9     
Combined family income      3,938        2,222        6,513 
  $24,999 and under  29.4        24.7        32.8     
  $25,000-$49,999  33.3        35.1        30.4     
  $50,000-$74,999  18.3        19.6        19.1     
  $75,000 and above  20.8        21.6        17.7     
                       
Sources: derived from NSFG Cycle 6 male and female datasets, 2002. 
Note: some sub-categories may not add up to 100% due to rounding. * The CEB value for women who are 26 and over is 
1.8 with a standard error of 0.04. Zhang: Religious affiliation, religiosity, and male and female fertility 
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Table 1-2:  Descriptive statistics for respondents who did not claim a religious 






(26 and over) 
  
Female  




SD  N   
Mean 
(or %) 
SD  N   
Mean 
(or %) 
SD  N 
Dependent variable                       
CEB  0.82  0.05  856    1.15  0.05  487    1.03*  0.03  1,107 
                       
Independent variables      -        -        - 
Religious affiliation  -        -        -     
Frequency of attending religious services   -        -        -     
Importance of religious beliefs  -        -        -     
                       
Control variables                       
Demographic factors                       
Age   29.3  0.24  972    35.3  0.19  512    29.0  0.20  1,107 
Race      972        512        1,107 
  Hispanic  12.0        10.0        11.7     
  Non-Hispanic white  74.0        78.6        73.2     
  Non-Hispanic black  9.3        8.3        9.3     
  Non-Hispanic other  4.8        3.1        5.8     
Nativity-if foreign born      971        511        1,109 
  Native born  87.4        87.2        86.9     
  Foreign born  12.6        12.1        13.1     
If R ever married      3,938        512        1,107 
  Yes  39.2        60.6        50.0     
  No  60.8        39.4        50.0     
                       
Socioeconomic factors                       
Education      972        512        1,107 
  No diploma   24.4        16.0        22.2     
  High school or less  30.9        32.7        30.5     
  Some college/college  22.5        19.2        26.3     
  University and above  22.2        32.1        21.0     
If R ever worked      972        512        1,107 
  Yes  93.3        99.1        91.6     
  No  6.7        0.9        8.4     
Combined family income      972        512        1,107 
  $24,999 and under  34.3        19.8        34.9     
  $25,000-$49,999  33.1        37.0        28.9     
  $50,000-$74,999  11.9        21.1        17.8     
  $75,000 and above  20.7        22.1        18.4     
 
Sources: derived from NSFG Cycle 6 male and female datasets, 2002. 
Note: some sub-categories may not add up to 100% due to rounding. * The CEB value for women who are 26 and over is 1.43 with 
a standard error of 0.04. Demographic Research: Volume 18, Article 8 
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In terms of the independent variables, Catholicism seems to be the most popular 
religion for all male respondents who claimed a religion (35.4%), followed by other 
Protestant religions (31%), fundamentalist Protestant religions (24.1%), and other non-
Christian  religions  (9.5%).  When  only  males  who  are  twenty-six  and  over  are 
considered, respondents who are affiliated with other Protestant religions (34.9%) and 
fundamentalist Protestant (31.2%) surpass Catholicism (24.1%). A similar pattern is 
shown  among  all  religious  females.  More  young  men  are  affiliated  with  Catholic 
religion is probably because although there has been a decline across cohorts in the 
propensity to declare religious beliefs, Catholic males are to a certain extent “immune” 
to this decline. So it seems that compared to all male respondents, the distribution of 
older male respondents who are twenty-six and over to various religious denominations 
are more similar to that of the female respondents. As far as religious participation is 
concerned, all male respondents and those who are twenty-six and older do not show 
significantly  different  patterns.  The  majority  (around  30%)  of  the  two  sets  of  men 
reported  attending  religious  services  less  than  once  a  month,  whereas  female 
respondents show a pattern of attending religious services more frequently than males. 
Compared  to  their  male  counterparts,  female  respondents  also  show  a  tendency  to 
consider  religious  beliefs  to  be  more  important.  For  instance,  57.9%  of  female 
respondents  report  that  religious  beliefs  are  “very  important”  in  their  daily  lives, 
compared to 49.5% of male respondents 26 and over, and 47.5% of all males. These 
results  somehow  indicate  that  women  are  more  likely  to  have  a  higher  level  of 
religiosity as compared to men, and older men tend to be more engaged in religion as 
compared  to  younger  men.  More  women  and  older  men  self-reported  as  being 
Protestant, whereas a higher percentage of younger men claimed themselves as Catholic.  
Demographically speaking, there is a higher percentage of Hispanic males than 
females and a lower percentage of black males than females in the dataset. Also, the 
percentage  of  married  women  is  higher  than  that  of  married  men,  which  could  be 
another reason for a higher female than male fertility rate due to the higher marriage 
rate of women than that of men. In terms of socioeconomic characteristics, men 26 and 
over reported a higher total combined family income as compared to the sub-groups 
that  include  all  males  and  females.  In  general,  men  tend  to  report  a  higher  total 
combined family income than women. The percentage of men who ever participated in 
the  labor  force  is  higher  than  that  of  women,  99.0%  versus  90.1%.  Interestingly, 
however,  a  higher  percentage  of  female  respondents  reported  a  higher  level  of 
education as compared to their male counterparts.  
The  average  age  of  non-religious  respondents  is  similar  to  their  religious 
counterparts.  However,  non-religious  respondents  tend  to  be  composed  by  a  higher 
percentage of whites and lower percentages of other racial groups. Non-religious male 
respondents are composed by a higher percentage of foreign born population, whereas a Zhang: Religious affiliation, religiosity, and male and female fertility 
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reverse pattern is shown among female respondents and male respondents who are 26 
and  over.  In  addition,  non-religious  population  is  more  likely  to  stay  single  than 
religious  population.  As  far  as  socioeconomic  characteristics,  there  are  a  higher 
percentage of men who have received university education among non-religious than 
religious respondents. For women, an opposite situation seems to be true, i.e., a higher 
percentage  of  non-religious  women  reported  high  school  or  lower  educational 
attainments  as  compared  to  their  female  religious  counterparts.  Only  marginal 
differences  are  shown  with  regard  to  employment  status  among  non-religious  and 
religious population. Compared to religious respondents, higher percentages of non-
religious female respondents and male respondents who are 26 and over are distributed 
to higher  family  income categories (categories  with family income above $50,000). 
These  demographic  and  socioeconomic  differentiations  between  religious  and  non-
religious  groups  indicate  that  it  is  necessary  to  examine  the  differential  effects  of 
religiosity on fertility among these two groups in future research. It is possible that 
demographic  and  socioeconomic  factors  could  interact  with  religiosity  to  determine 
fertility.   
 
 
4. Statistical methods and results 
Given that CEB is a count variable, Poisson regression is the statistical procedure used 
to  conduct  these  analyses.  The  Poisson  model  is  superior  to  ordinary  least  squares 
(OLS)  or  other  linear  models  in  this  instance  because  the  distribution  of  a  count 
variable, such as CEB, is one that is heavily skewed with a long right tail, especially in 
the cases of low fertility populations. The skewed distribution of the CEB is due to the 
observed  distribution  of  data  with  a  very  low  mean,  which  reflects  many  women 
desiring few children and few women wanting many children in low fertility countries. 
Poisson regression is the suitable procedure to estimate CEB also because CEB is a 
positive  integer.  Applying  the  linear  regression  model  to  count  outcomes  is  not 
appropriate  since  it  could  result  in  “inefficient,  inconsistent,  and  biased  estimates” 
(Long and Freese 2006: 349).  
The Poisson regression model can be written as: 
 
( ) k ki i i i b X b X b X a + + + + = ... exp 2 2 1 1 µ  
 
Where  µi  is  the  mean  of  the  distribution,  which  is  estimated  from  observed 
characteristics of the independent variables; a is the constant; bi represents deviation 
from the mean of the omitted category, which is the reference group. The X variables 
are related to µ nonlinearly. In this case, µi is the expected number of children born to a Demographic Research: Volume 18, Article 8 
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respondent based on the respondent’s religious affiliation, level of religiosity, and so 
forth. All cases are weighted based on the final weights of each sample given by the 
NSFG.  
Since  46%  of  females  and  42%  of  male  respondents  reported  themselves  as 
childless,  there  might  be  a  problem  of  over-dispersion  and  too  many  zeroes  in  the 
dataset. To justify these potential problems, I also estimate negative binomial regression 
models (NBRMs). Additionally, I drop the cases with a CEB value of 0, and I use the 
zero-truncated  models  (ZTMs)  to  compare  the  results  with  the  Poisson  regression 
results.  
 
Table 2-1:  Poisson regression of CEB on religious affiliation, participation and 
beliefs: all male and female respondents in the U.S., 2002  
Variables  Model 1   Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5 
Religious variables           
Current religious affiliation  (ref. = Catholic)           
  Fundamentalist protestant  0.06      0.06  0.04 
  Other protestant  0.04      0.05  0.03 
  Other non-Christian religion  -0.15*      -0.14*  -0.14* 
Religiosity           
  Frequency attending religious services    0.02    0.01   
  Importance of religious beliefs      0.09***    0.08*** 
           
Demographic factors           
Age   0.05***  0.06***  0.05***  0.05***  0.06*** 
Gender (ref. = male)  -0.14***  -0.15***  -0.13***  -0.14***  -0.13*** 
Race (ref. group = Hispanic)           
  Hispanic  0.23***  0.21***  0.19***  0.23***  0.21*** 
  Non-Hispanic black  0.25***  0.26***  0.23***  0.25***  0.22*** 
  Non-Hispanic other   0.21*  0.16  0.15  0.21*  0.18 
If R has ever been married  1.02***  1.02***  1.01***  1.01***  1.01*** 
           
Socioeconomic factors           
Highest degree R ever earned  -0.07***  -0.07***  -0.07***  -0.07***  -0.07*** 
Total combined family income  -0.02***  -0.03***  -0.02***  -0.03***  -0.02*** 
Constant   -1.55***  -1.54***  -1.70***  -1.58***  -1.72*** 
N  9,759  9,750  9,729  9,750  9,729 
Prob > F   0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
           
Sources: derived from NSFG Cycle 6 male and female datasets, 2002.       
Note: R refers to respondent. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 (two-tailed tests). Regression results for nativity and ever work 
are not reported due to non-significant regression coefficients. 
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Table 2-1 presents the Poisson regression results analyzing the combined dataset 
with all male and female respondents. In model 1, I include the religious affiliation 
variable and socioeconomic characteristics as the control variables. Compared to being 
Catholics,  being  members  of  other  non-Christian  religions  multiplies  the  expected 
number of CEB by a factor of 0.86; that is, it decreases by 14% (e
-0.15), other things 
being  equal.  Fundamentalist  Protestants  and  other  Protestants  do  not  seem  to  have 
significantly different levels of CEB compared to Catholics. 
In models 2 and 3, I replace the current religious denomination variable with the 
variables of frequency attending religious services and importance of religious beliefs 
in people’s daily lives, respectively.  Apparently, people who reported that religious 
beliefs play an important role in their daily lives tend to have a higher level of CEB, 
whereas religious participation does not show a significant impact on fertility. A similar 
pattern  also  is  found  in  models  4  and  5,  after  controlling  the  effect  of  religious 
denomination on fertility. Over the total range of scale from 1 to 3 measuring religious 
beliefs, the expected CEB is  multiplied by a  factor of 1.1 (e
0.08), holding the other 
variables constant (see model 5). This means that the strength of religious beliefs does 
have  a  significantly  positive  impact  on  people’s  fertility,  regardless  of  to  which 
religious denomination they belong. However, frequent churchgoers do not really show 
a significantly higher level of CEB. These findings corroborate hypothesis 2 but reject 
hypothesis 1. Hypothesis 3 is tested by comparing the results of model 1 with models 4 
and 5. Results show that fertility differentials among various groups do not change 
significantly, nor do the other variables after taking religiosity into consideration. This 
finding does not support hypothesis 3, which means that fertility differentiation among 
people who belong to different religious groups keeps a similar pattern after controlling 
for the levels of people’s religiosity.  
In addition to the clear effect of religious denomination and religious beliefs on 
fertility, most of the covariates are very influential as well. According to model 5, from 
the age range of 15 to 45, the level of expected CEB increases by around 6% (e
0.06). 
Being a man decreases the level of expected CEB by 12% (e
-0.13), compared to being a 
woman, which emphasizes the significant gender effect on fertility. Ever having been 
married increases the respondent’s CEB by a factor of 2.8 (e
1.01), which indicates the 
imperative  role  of  marriage  in  determining  fertility.  In  terms  of  racial  and  ethnic 
background, being of Hispanic background multiplies the number of children born to a 
respondent by a factor of 1.2 (e
0.21), holding the other independent variables constant. 
That is, Hispanics tend to have a CEB that is 20% higher as compared to whites. Blacks 
and other racial groups also have a greater expected number of children than whites. 
Education and income have a negative and significant influence on fertility.  Demographic Research: Volume 18, Article 8 
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Table 2-2:  Poisson regression of CEB on religious affiliation, participation and 
beliefs: male respondents 26 and over and all female respondents in 
the U.S., 2002  
Variables  Model 1   Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5 
Religious variables           
Current religious affiliation  (ref. = Catholic)           
  Fundamentalist protestant  0.05      0.05  0.03 
  Other protestant  0.03      0.03  0.02 
  Other non-Christian religion  -0.16*      -0.15*  -0.16* 
Religiosity           
  Frequency attending religious services    0.02    0.01   
  Importance of religious beliefs      0.09***    0.08*** 
           
Demographic factors           
Age   0.05***  0.05***  0.05***  0.05***  0.05*** 
Gender (ref. = male)  -0.10***  -0.10***  -0.09***  -0.10***  -0.08*** 
Race (ref. group = Hispanic)           
  Hispanic  0.20***  0.18***  0.17***  0.20***  0.18*** 
  Non-Hispanic black  0.24***  0.24***  0.22***  0.23***  0.21*** 
  Non-Hispanic other   0.18*  0.13  0.11  0.17  0.15 
If R has ever been married  0.96***  0.96***  0.96***  0.96***  0.95*** 
           
Socioeconomic factors           
Highest degree R ever earned  -0.07***  -0.07***  -0.07***  -0.07***  -0.07*** 
Total combined family income  -0.02***  -0.02***  -0.02***  -0.03***  -0.02*** 
Constant   -1.31***  -1.32***  -1.48***  -1.35***  -1.48*** 
N  8,638  8,629  8,613  8,629  8,613 
Prob > F   0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
           
Sources: derived from NSFG Cycle 6 male and female datasets, 2002.       
Note: R refers to respondent. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 (two-tailed tests). Regression results for nativity and ever work 
are not reported due to non-significant regression coefficients. 
 
 
In  Table  2-2,  I  exclude  those  male  respondents  who  are  25  and  younger.  In 
general,  religious  denomination,  religious  participation,  and  religious  beliefs  show 
similar effects on fertility to those shown in Table 2-1, which again supports hypothesis 
2  and  rejects  hypotheses  1  and  3.  However,  two  demographic  covariates,  namely, 
gender and ever married, show  weaker effects  when  younger  male respondents are 
dropped from the analyses. Also, dropping younger male respondents from the analyses 
changes the negative gender bias from 12% (e
0.13) to 8% (e
0.08). And the positive effect 
of ever being married compared to never married alters from multiplying a factor of 2.8 
(e
1.01) to 2.6 (e
0.95). These findings suggest being a man and ever being married tend to 
have  weaker effects on a population composed of older men. The  weaker effect of Zhang: Religious affiliation, religiosity, and male and female fertility 
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being a male on fertility can be explained by the later fertility peak of men and the 
problem of underreporting which may happen more frequently among younger men 
than among older. The weaker effect of marriage on fertility in Table 2-2 shows the 
importance of marriage on childbearing behavior, especially among younger men. 
Until now, I have tested hypotheses on impacts of religious denominations and 
religiosity on fertility. Next, I will elaborate the model that tests whether the effects of 
the religion and religiosity on fertility vary by gender. Models 1, 2 and 3 in Table 3 
display Poisson regression results when analyzing all male and female respondents after 
generating  gender  interaction  terms.  In  model  1,  I  include  variables  of  religious 
denomination, gender interaction terms, and socioeconomic variables to test hypothesis 
4 to determine whether fertility differentials among religious groups vary by gender. As 
can be seen, the gender interaction terms generated by religious denominations and 
gender are not significant, which indicates that fertility differentials among religious 
groups do not vary substantially between men and women. This supports hypothesis 4, 
as  there  are  no  significant  gender  differences  regarding  fertility  differentials  among 
religious groups, controlling for other factors. In models 2 and 3 of Table 3, I test 
whether the effect of religious participation and religious beliefs on fertility varies by 
gender after controlling religious denominations, respectively. Neither of the gender 
interaction terms is observed as significant. This opposes hypotheses 5 and 6, and it 
implies  that  stronger  religiosity  does  not  appear  to  increase  women’s  fertility  to  a 
greater extent than men’s, controlling other factors.  
Models 4 through 6 replicate the Poisson estimates of CEB in models 1, 2 and 3, 
excluding  male  respondents  who  are  25  and  younger.  There  is  no  strong  evidence 
showing gender differences in terms of religious denominations and religiosity shaping 
fertility,  which  is  consistent  with  the  findings  analyzing  all  male  and  female 
respondents.  Comparing  the  results  with  and  without  analyzing  younger  male 
respondents, the major differences again lie in the effects of gender and ever married 
on  fertility.  It  suggests  including  fertility  reports  of  younger  men  will  not  change 
extensively the estimated relationship between religious variables and fertility.  Demographic Research: Volume 18, Article 8 
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Table 3:  Poisson regression of CEB on religious variables and gender 
interaction terms: U.S., 2002  
  All male and female respondents    Males 26 + and all females 
Variables  Model 1   Model 2  Model 3    Model 4  Model 5  Model 6 
Religious variables               
Current religious affiliation  (ref. = Catholic)               
  Fundamentalist protestant  0.08  0.07  0.06    0.07  0.06  0.05 
  Other protestant  0.02  0.01  0.01    0.01  0.00  -0.01 
  Other non-Christian religion  -0.12  -0.12  -0.11    -0.14  -0.13  -0.12 
Religiosity               
  Frequency attending religious services    0.02        0.02   
  Importance of religious beliefs      0.09***        0.10*** 
               
Interaction terms               
Current religious affiliation  (ref. = Catholic)               
  Fundamentalist protestant * gender  -0.04  -0.02  -0.04    -0.05  -0.03  -0.04 
  Other protestant * gender  0.06  0.08  0.06    0.07  0.08  0.07 
  Other non-Christian religion * gender  -0.05  -0.04  -0.06    -0.05  -0.04  -0.06 
Religiosity               
  Frequency attending religious services *    
  gender 
  -0.02        -0.02   
  Importance of religious beliefs * gender      -0.01        -0.04 
               
Demographic factors               
Age   0.06***  0.06***  0.06***    0.05***  0.05***  0.05*** 
Gender (ref. = male)  -0.15***  -0.12  -0.10    -0.10*  -0.06  0.00 
Race (ref. group = Hispanic)               
  Hispanic  0.23***  0.23***  0.21***    0.20***  0.20***  0.18*** 
  Non-Hispanic black  0.25***  0.25***  0.23***    0.24***  0.23***  0.21*** 
  Non-Hispanic other   0.21*  0.21*  0.19    0.18  0.18  0.16 
If R has ever been married  1.02***  1.02***  1.01***    0.96***  0.96***  0.95*** 
               
Socioeconomic factors               
Highest degree R ever earned  -0.07***  -0.07***  -0.07***    -0.07***  -0.07***  -0.07*** 
Total combined family income  -0.02***  -0.03***  -0.02***    -0.02***  -0.02***  -0.02*** 
Constant   -1.55***  -1.60***  -1.73***    -1.31***  -1.37***  -1.52*** 
N  9,759  9,750  9,729    8,638  8,629  8,629 
Prob > F   0.0000  0.0000  0.0000    0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
 
Sources: derived from NSFG Cycle 6 male and female datasets, 2002. 
Note: R refers to respondent. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 (two-tailed tests). Regression results for nativity and ever work 
are not reported due to non-significant regression coefficients. 
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Because 46% of men and 42% of women reported having no children, there may 
be a problem of overdispersion, i.e. the variance of CEB is greater than the mean. So I 
estimate the negative binomial regression models (NBRMs) to compare the results with 
those of the Poisson regression analyses. Comparison results do not show any evidence 
of overdispersion (findings are not presented here and are available from the author 
upon request) because the alphas are zero, which indicate that the NBRMs reduce to the 
Poisson  regression  models.  The  zero-truncated  regression  (ZTM)  results  shown  in 
Table  4  indicate  that  religion  and  religiosity  have  similar  impacts  on  people  who 
voluntarily choose not to have children (i.e. the expected CEBs are not always 0) and 
people who are physically infertile (i.e. the expected CEB are always 0). However, I do 
find  a  few  distinctions  comparing  the  Poisson  and  the  ZTM  results.  First,  fertility 
differences  among  Catholics  and  other  non-Christian  religious  groups  become 
insignificant in the ZTMs, after controlling for other factors. This echoes the finding 
that fertility differentials among religious groups are shrinking. This is especially the 
case when only people who have children are considered. Second, the magnitude of 
demographic factors, especially marriage, in influencing fertility reduces in the ZTMs 
compared to that in the Poisson regression models. This finding suggests that marriage 
is  crucial  in  terms  of  childbearing.  But  once  childbearing  behavior  occurs,  its 
significance decreases. A finding from the ZTMs that is worth highlighting is that the 
results of datasets with and without younger male respondents are almost identical, with 
the effect of gender being slightly reduced. Such a finding could be due to less variation 
in  fertility  behavior  among  men  and  women  who  have  already  become  parents 
compared to populations that are composed of men and women who are not parents.  
The similar finding drawn from the two types of analyses, however, is that the 
impacts of religious denominations and religiosity on fertility do not vary between men 
and women. And the importance a respondent places on religious beliefs in his or her 
daily life has a significant and positive effect on childbearing behavior, regardless of 
whether younger male respondents are excluded from the models. Indeed, the Poisson 
and ZTM results either support or oppose all of my research hypotheses in the same 
manner,  indicating  underreporting  among  younger  men  that  possibly  occurs  in  the 
dataset does not significantly change the findings of this research. 
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Table 4:  Zero-truncated regression of CEB on religious variables, 
demographic factors and gender interaction terms: U.S., 2002  
  All male and female respondents    Males 26 + and all females 
Variables  Model 1   Model 2  Model 3    Model 4  Model 5  Model 6 
Religious variables               
Current religious affiliation  (ref. = Catholic)               
  Fundamentalist protestant  0.05  0.04  0.03    0.05  0.04  0.03 
  Other protestant  0.04  0.04  0.02    0.04  0.04  0.02 
  Other non-Christian religion  -0.04  -0.04  -0.03    -0.04  -0.04  -0.03 
Religiosity               
  Frequency attending religious services    0.03        0.03*   
  Importance of religious beliefs      0.10**        0.11** 
               
Interaction terms               
Current religious affiliation  (ref. = Catholic)               
  Fundamentalist protestant * gender  -0.02  0.01  -0.01    -0.03  -0.00  -0.02 
  Other protestant * gender  0.00  0.02  0.00    -0.01  0.02  -0.00 
  Other non-Christian religion * gender  -0.10  -0.09  -0.12    -0.14  -0.13  -0.15 
Religiosity               
  Frequency attending religious services *    
  gender 
  -0.04        -0.04   
  Importance of religious beliefs * gender      -0.05        -0.05 
               
Demographic factors               
Age   0.04***  0.04***  0.04***    0.04***  0.04***  0.04*** 
Gender (ref. = male)  -0.09  0.01  0.05    -0.06  0.04  0.08 
Race (ref. group = Hispanic)               
  Hispanic  0.12**  0.12**  0.09*    0.11*  0.11*  0.08 
  Non-Hispanic black  0.12**  0.11*  0.09    0.11*  0.11*  0.09 
  Non-Hispanic other   0.20  0.20  0.18    0.19  0.19  0.17 
If R has ever been married  0.22***  0.21***  0.21***    0.21***  0.21***  0.21*** 
               
Socioeconomic factors               
Highest degree R ever earned  -0.06***  -0.06***  -0.06***    -0.06***  -0.06***  -0.07*** 
Total combined family income  -0.02**  -0.02**  -0.02**    -0.02**  -0.02**  -0.02** 
Constant   -0.29***  -0.36***  -0.51**    -0.19  -0.26  -0.42*** 
N  5,304  5,299  5,299    5,130  5,125  5,125 
Prob > F   0.0000  0.0000  0.0000    0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
 
Sources: derived from NSFG Cycle 6 Male and Female Datasets, 2002. 
Note: R refers to respondent. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 (two-tailed tests). Variables nativity and ever work have been 
dropped from the regression due to non-significant regression coefficients. 
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5. Conclusion 
In this article, I shed light on the effects of religious denomination and religiosity on 
male and female fertility. Mosher and associates (Mosher, Johnson, and Horn 1986; 
National Center for Health Statistics 2005; Westoff and Jones 1979) have reported a 
shrinking pattern of fertility differentials among religious groups. My findings reflect 
this by showing no significant fertility differences between fundamentalist Protestants, 
other Protestants, and Catholics. Catholics only show a significantly higher level of 
fertility when compared to other non-Christian religious people. And such a fertility 
differential disappears when childless respondents are dropped from the analyses.  
Compared  to  studies  of  religious  denomination  and  fertility,  religiosity  has 
received far less attention in the literature. The findings demonstrated in this research, 
however,  help  to  address  this  shortcoming.  I  find  even  after  controlling  religious 
denomination and demographic and socioeconomic factors, the importance of religious 
beliefs still exhibits a graded association with fertility in the United States. This finding 
echoes the findings based on the social contexts of European countries (Adsera 2007; 
Ongaro 2001; Westoff and Frejka 2007). This substantially positive effect of religious 
beliefs on fertility must have something to do with the role of religion in guiding human 
behavior in terms of the issues of sexuality, cohabitation, marriage, and the function of 
family. In general, a number of religious doctrines are linked to delayed sexual debut 
and entry into cohabitation, and more positive attitudes toward entering marital unions 
and having children (Bearman and Bruckner 2001; Lehrer 2004; Marchena and Waite 
2001). As stated earlier in this article, Catholicism encourages large family size and is 
strongly against abortion. The Mormon theology emphasizes the central role of the 
family in the religious community. Both Protestants and Mormons have incentives to 
marry  early  and  are  oriented  to  home-based  activities.  As  a  result,  deeming  such 
religious beliefs important in daily life makes people more likely to internalize their 
church  teachings  and  thus  to  favor  a  large  family  size.  This  perhaps  explains  why 
religiosity is influential in terms of both male and female fertility.   
 I  do  not  find  significant  effects  of  religious  participation  on  fertility.  In  fact, 
frequent churchgoers only display a higher level of fertility  when demographic and 
socioeconomic factors are not controlled (findings are available from the author upon 
request). So it is likely that fertility differences are caused by variations in demographic 
and  socioeconomic  factors  among  religious  members  rather  than  their  frequency  of 
religious participation. Such a finding echoes the characteristics hypothesis. It suggests 
that  religious  beliefs  might  be  a  better  predictor  of  fertility  than  the  behavioral 
dimension.  
Compared  to  women’s  fertility,  men’s  fertility  is  impacted  by  religious 
denomination, participation, and beliefs in a similar manner. It is easy to understand Demographic Research: Volume 18, Article 8 
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why religious denominations determine men’s and women’s fertility in a similar way. 
But it is hard to interpret why religiosity does not show a stronger effect on female 
fertility  than  on  male,  which  is  the  general  pattern  found  in  previous  studies.  One 
possible  explanation  for  this  inconsistency  is  that  previous  studies  seldom  use 
significance  tests  to  justify  whether  the  effects  of  religious  variables  on  male  and 
female  fertility  are  different  from  each  other.  Different  regression  coefficients  in 
separate male and female datasets could be caused by non-identical male and female 
sample  sizes and standard errors. Thus, results based on  statistical tests  which take 
sample size and standard error into consideration should be more reliable than those not 
based  on  such  tests.  Such  statistical  methods  include  generating  gender  interaction 
terms and Z statistical tests (Paternoster, Brame, Mazerolle, and Piquero 1998). The 
stronger effect of religiosity on female fertility observed in previous literature probably 
is based on the larger regression coefficients estimated in the female models, which 
indeed have not been statistically compared with those of males. The other possible 
explanation is that most of the literature cited in the current research is drawn from 
European societies. The American social context may lead to dissimilar findings with 
regard to the effect of religiosity on fertility.  
Additional research is warranted in this area to contrast religious influences on 
fertility, especially at the national level. I recognize that the measurement of religious 
denominations and religiosity is  very limited in the NSFG dataset. Some important 
dimensions of religious participation and beliefs, such as dimensions of frequency of 
prayer  or  meditation,  frequency  of  reading  holy  books,  or  beliefs  in  a  God  or  an 
afterlife,  are  not  available  in  the  NSFG  dataset  and  are  thus  not  considered  in  this 
research.  Future  research  that  includes  these  variables  would  improve  the  religious 
studies  of  male  and  female  fertility.  In  addition,  this  article  excludes  those  people 
without  religious  affiliations  due  to  data  unavailability  in  the  NSFG  dataset.  It  is 
possible that some people who are not affiliated with any religions actively participate 
religious services. In order to fully address the impact of religiosity on fertility, future 
research needs to bring those without religious affiliations into the analysis. 
The  influence  of  religion  on  men’s  and  women’s  fertility  also  depends  on  the 
social  contexts  to  which  religious  people  belong.  Future  research  could  consider 
community- or country-level religious variables along with individual level variables to 
estimate religious influences on male and female fertility. In addition, future research 
could consider examining the interaction effects between religious denominations and 
religiosity  in  determining  fertility,  which  has  been  illustrated  by  some  researchers 
(Lehrer 2004; Marcum 1988). The interaction effects shown in my preliminary analyses 
are  not  significant,  which  could  be  due  to  the  limited  measurements  of  religiosity 
applied in the analyses. Including more sound measurements of religiosity when such 
data become available would allow us to explore this matter in a more detailed manner.   Zhang: Religious affiliation, religiosity, and male and female fertility 
256    http://www.demographic-research.org 
The  comparison  of  the  results  of  Poisson  and  ZTMs  of  all  respondents  and 
respondents excluding younger men do not vary from each other in a notable manner. 
This suggests that serious underreporting of births among younger men that may exist 
in the NSFG dataset does not change significantly the results of my religious studies of 
fertility.   
In sum, religion is a very important institution spreading behavioral norms and 
providing social support for people. My analyses reveal that the fertility gap among 
religious  groups  is  decreasing,  whereas  religiosity,  especially  religious  beliefs, 
demonstrates  a  significantly  positive  effect  on  fertility.  Women  do  not  exhibit  a 
substantially greater likelihood of being influenced by either religious denomination or 
by religiosity than men. Thus, religion does not seem to be a factor that differentiates 
male and female fertility among the U.S. religious population.  
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